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RECENT CASES

Judgments, where remainders are created in unborn children or
where property is limited to the heirs of a living person, an action
which would permit the unknown future owners later to re-open a
contest as to the rights in the subject matter would be against a
public policy which seeks certainty of title and marketability of
property. 15 In face of this case, one would wonder what reliance
Missouri lawyers might put in the Missouri Bar's Title Standard 10:
Where a judgment or decree affecting the title to real estate has been
entered of record for more than 31 years and appears in the abstract,
but the remainder of the action either is not shown, or is incompletely shown, and where such judgment or decree gives full information as to the status of parties and the nature of the action, which is
sufficient upon which to base an opinion as to the validity of the
proceedings in question, the proceedings shall be presumed to be
valid and binding as to all matters recited in the judgment or decree,
and such showing shall be accepted as sufficient, unless something
affirmatively appears therein, showing lack of jurisdiction of either
the parties or the subject.

S. Roy Woodall, Jr.

CONSTrrmtUONAL LAw-FEEDOM OF T=E PREss-MumciPAL ORDmiNANcE
RESTRICTING Drs-mBuTroN OF HANDBILsL-Petitioner distributed hand-

bills in Los Angeles urging a boycott against specified merchants who
carried products of manufacturers alleged to be discriminatory toward
racial minorities in their employment practices. The handbills carried
only the name of "National Consumers Mobilization." Petitioner was
prosecuted under a city ordinance prohibiting distribution, in any
place and under any circumstances, of handbills which did not have
printed on them the true names and addresses of the author, distributor and sponsor.' Petitioner was convicted, fined $10 and
exhausted his remedies by appeal to the Appellate Department of
the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles which affirmed the
conviction. 2 That court rejected petitioner's seasonable contention
15 §87, comment a (1942).
1 City of Los Angeles, Calif., Municipal Code §28.06 provides:
No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of the following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the
same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided,
however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to
such fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the owners,
managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also
appear thereon.
2
People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 797; 832 P. 2d 447 (1958).
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that the ordinance violated his freedom of speech and press in contravention of the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal
constitution, whereupon certiorari was granted. Held: Reversed.
The ordinance was declared unconstitutional as an abridgment of
freedom of speech and press, three justices dissenting. Talley v. California, 862 U.S. 60 (1960).
The Court discussed the history of the federal handbill rule as
announced in Lovell v. City of Griffin 3 and found the present ordinance
to be invalid within that rule unless saved by the qualification that
identified handbills might be lawfully distributed. Finding, historically, that anonymous literature has been beneficial to many
worthy causes, the Court concluded that the requirement of identification and fear of reprisal might deter peaceful discussion of important
public matters, analogous to the principle of the N.A.A.C.P. cases, 4 and
declared the ordinance void on its face.
Once it had been established that the first amendment prohibitions applied to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment,5
and that review of municipal ordinances came within the purview of
the Supreme Court,6 there remained the difficulty of determining the
scope of such freedoms, i.e., drawing the line between liberty and
license. Prior to the Lovell case municipal ordinances regulating
handbills appear to have fallen into three categories: 7 First, those
which prohibited any distribution of any literature;8 second, those
restricting the manner of distribution;9 and third, those restricting or
prohibiting certain types of literature.' 0
3303 U.S. 444 (1938).
4 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
5 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
6
Home T. & T. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1912); Raymond v.
Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 675 (1938).
8 City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 111. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930) (invalidated);
People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889) (invalidated as unreasonable); Anderson v. State, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N.W. 149 (1903) (ordinance
upheld as within police power); Dziatkiewicz v. Maplewood, 115 N.J.L. 37, 178
AUt. 205 (1935) (upheld); Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 352
(1931) (upheld).
9 San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San Francisco, 69 F. 2d 879
(9th Cir. 1934); Sieroty v.City of Huntington Park, 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 Pac.
564 (1931); Goldblatt Bros. Corp. v. East Chicago, 211 Ind. 621, 6 N.E. 2d 331
(1937); Allen v. McGovern, 12 N.J. Misc. 12, 169 Ad. 345 (1933); Philadelphia
v. Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 AUt. 374 (1902).
10 Sieroty v. City of Huntington Park, supra note 9; People v. St. John, 108
Cal. App. 279, 288 Pac. 53 (1930); Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. App. 552, 39
Pac. 343 (1895); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 13 N.E. 2d 18 (Mass. 1938); Alniassi
y, City of Newark, 8 N.J. Misc. 420? 150 AtI, 217 (1930),

1961]

RECENT CASES

Lovell obviously invalidated the first class of ordinances, but just
how far its authority extended into the other classes was uncertain.
Eighteen months later, as if to lay aside all doubt, the Court decided
Schneider v. State," a collection of cases involving four municipal
ordinances which fell into both the latter classes, and held that Lovell
governed. Schneider not only plugged the loopholes left by the Lovell
rule, but also strengthened a doctrine first suggested in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.'2 Carolene hinted, in a now famous footnote, that legislative abridgment of the freedoms of speech and press
would not enjoy the same presumption of constitutionality normally
accorded other municipal and state legislation.
In Lovell, Schneider and Jamison v. Texas'3 the Court seemingly
ignored the "bad tendency" test laid down in Pierce v. United States,14
which amounted to a test of the reasonableness, under the fourteenth amendment, of the legislation which sought to correct a substantive evil by expressly interfering 15 with free speech. Instead the
Court invalidated on the basis of prior restraint amounting to censorship and/or on the objection to the broad, unlimited scope of the
restrictive ordinances. Of course, both of these objections could be
viewed as variations of the reasonableness test; but the Court's
emphasis seemed to be on a weighing of the interests involved: the
community's interest in the restraint versus the interest, both societal
and individual, in the maintenance of the freedom. Such an interpretation was borne out by the later decisions in American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds16 and Dennis v. United States'7 which
explicitly adopted the weighing of interests test in first amendment
18
cases.
In 1940, Cantwell v. Connecticut19 held that a state may by general
and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places and
11308 U.S. 147
12 304 U.S. 144
13 318 U.S. 413
14252 U.S. 239

(1939).
(1938).
(1943).
(1920).

15 In Gitlow v. New York, supra note 5, the Court refused to apply the

"clear and present danger" test of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
because the interfering statute in Schenck was a non-speech statute (an interference with speech under the Federal Espionage Act of 1917, which did not
mention speech), whereas the New York Criminal Anarchy law in Gitlow
expressly restricted speech. Presumably the analogy is applicable to Lovell and
Schneider wherein the offending ordinances explicitly restricted freedom of the
press.
10 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
17 841 U.S. 494 (1951).
18 See Goldberg, "Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of First
Amendment Freedoms," 13 Ohio St. L.J. 237, 261 (1952).
19310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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the manner of solicitation and speech (and by inference, written
speech) upon its streets. In 1942, Valentine v. Chrestensen20 held that
a municipality might prohibit the distribution upon any street or
public place of commercial handbills and advertising matter even
though the reverse side of the handbill carried a political protest. In
1951, Breard v. Alexandria2' held that uninvited door-to-door canvassing could be completely prohibited by a city as an invasion of
privacy. With these exceptions, Lovell and its companion cases comprised the hand bill law until the Court decided that Los Angeles'
ordinance "falls precisely under the ban of our prior cases....-22
Justice Harlan, concurring in Talley,23 was unwilling to accept the
majority contention that the ordinance was void on its face, but
voted to reverse because he felt that the city failed to show the
requisite degree of necessity "to furnish a constitutionally acceptable
justification for the deterrent effect on free speech which this all24
embracing ordinance is likely to have."
In a vigorous dissent by Justice Clark, in which Justices Frankfurter
and Whittaker joined, the majority decision is criticised on four
grounds: (1) the decision abandons the weighing of interests test and
disregards the city's alleged interest in restraining fraud, deceit, false
advertisement, obscenity and libel; (2) the decision has the effect of
shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of the ordinance; (3) the
concept of a constitutional freedom of anonymity is contrary to the
concept embodied in Congressional regulation of newspapers' secondclass mailing privileges, 25 federal regulation of lobbying, 20 and the
various state corrupt practices acts prohibiting anonymous publications
in respect to political campaigns and elections; and, 4) the decision is
not consistent with the regulation of handbills and solicitation permitted in Valentine and Breard, supra. It is this writer's conviction
that all four objections are valid.
First, the majority summarily categorized the ordinance as class
one, above, as all-prohibitive with the minor exception of identified
handbills. This is an exercise in semantics. A more reasonable
classification would be class three, above, a classification of the
ordinance as one prohibiting only one isolated type of handbill, i.e.,
20316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21341 U.S. 622 (1951).
22

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960).
23 Id. at 66.
24
Id. at 67.
2
5 Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, §233, 37 Stat. 533, 39 U.S.C.

§233 26(1952).
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §267
(1952).
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those which are anonymous. By its abrupt and arbitrary labeling of
the ordinance, the Court gives short shrift to Los Angeles' avowed
intention to inhibit false and misleading advertising, libel and obscenity and does damage to the healthy weighing of interests which
ought to determine the extent of the freedom.
27
Second, the Court equates the case with the N.A.A.C.P. cases,
which is an improper comparison. In the latter cases the petitioners,
in attacking the legislation requiring disclosure, sustained their burden
of proof by offers of incontroverted evidence that identification in the
past had led to harassment, threats of bodily harm and fear of
community hostility and economic reprisal, whereas "Talley makes no
showing whatever to support his contention that a restraint upon
his freedom of speech will result from the enforcement of the
ordinance."28 In holding for Talley on the basis of his bare contention
of infringement of first amendment rights the Court has, in effect,
placed the burden upon the respondent city to show the necessity
for the ordinance. This curious shifting of the burden of proof follows
the line hinted at in Speiser v. Randall2 9 where the Court concluded:
[We hold that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be
deterred by a State's general taxing program, due process demands
that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with
sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.

Third, even though the inflammatory Stamp Act of 1765 required
that the name of the publisher appear on every newspaper, the same
is required by modem postal regulations" which were ruled constitutional in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan.3' New York ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman32 held that New York might properly require a
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan to identify its members. A judge who
heard Talley's primary appeal3 3 compared this case with N.A.A.C.P.
v. Alabama 4 and was led to remark:
We have no clear-cut decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on the

supposed right to publish anonymously; two of their cases which may
bear on the question are conflicting .... The distinction which Mr.
Justice Harlan draws between the two seems to be that the members
of N.A.A.C.P.3 5 are good guys and the members of Ku Klux Klan are
wicked men.
27

Cases cited note 4 supra.
Talley v. California, supra note 22, at 69.
29 357 U.S. 513, 528 (1958).
30 Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, §233, 37 Stat. 533, 39 U.S.C. §233
28

(1952).

31229 U.S. 288 (1913).
32278 U.S. 63 (1928).
33 People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 797, 832 P. 2d 447 (1958).

34 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
5People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 797, -

3

,332, P. 2d 447, 452 (1958).
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When the Talley decision is compared with Cantwell, Breard, and
Valentine, supra, it is small wonder that the courts and legislatures
are hard put to determine just where the fine and somewhat erratic
line is drawn.
In conclusion, it may be that under the circumstances presented
there should be a constitutional freedom of anonymity and that the
Court reached the proper result. However, it is submitted that the
method whereby this result was reached has not served to clarify
constitutional problems and has posed a significant threat to the
weighing of interests test.
James H. Jeffries III

